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Introduction
Although REDD+ is approaching its 10th anniversary,
major impacts in terms of reduced forest loss are hard to
document. Conservation practitioners and scholars are
therefore increasingly asking why REDD+ has not deliv-
ered more tangible results. A recent Comment in Conser-
vation Biology by Fletcher et al. (2016) addresses this
question. We agree with Fletcher et al. that REDD+ has
been hyped in some circles, which has created unrealistic
expectations among policy makers and forest dwellers
alike. Yet, we argue that Fletcher et al. put forward an
incomplete interpretation of the evolving REDD+ con-
cept and practice and wrongly place the responsibility
for lack of progress on the principles of payment for
environmental services (PES) and on reliance on market-
based instruments (MBIs), in part based on their misun-
derstanding of the PES concept.
Potential answers to the question of why REDD+
has not delivered more tangible results fall into 4 cate-
gories: REDD+ has not yet been implemented at the scale
needed to make a difference, REDD+ has evolved from
the initial PES vision to amodified version of previous and
largely ineffective conservation efforts, REDD+ has been
blocked by powerful actors interested in maintaining the
status quo, and REDD+ is conceptually flawed in its de-
sign as a PES and MBI scheme. Fletcher et al. fail to fully
appreciate the first 3 problems, overemphasize the pre-
sumed flaws in REDD+ as a PES design, and prepare the
ground for the rise and fall of the next conservation fad
(Redford et al. 2013). We believe that REDD+, although
troubled, is not dead.
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REDD+ as a MBI
Initially, REDD+ was envisioned by most as integral to a
global cap-and-trade carbon market. The proposal had
3 interlinked characteristics: result-based PES through
REDD+ credits (certified emission reductions), funding
fromREDD+ credits sold in a carbonmarket, and REDD+
credits being used as offsets to comply with national
emissions caps. This historic vision of REDD+ could ap-
propriately be termed an MBI, but this vision no longer
represents reality.
A global carbon market has not materialized and is
unlikely to emerge. The Paris agreement failed to create
the binding national caps needed to boost demand for
global carbon trading. Approximately US$10 billion of
cumulative international pledges are mainly from multi-
lateral and bilateral aid agencies (Norman & Nakhooda
2014). The amount is a far cry from the US$10–15 billion
per year called for to cut global deforestation by half
(Stern 2006).
International REDD+ funding has evolved into a light
form of result-based aid (Angelsen 2017), exemplified
by Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative
(NICFI) and Germany’s REDD Early Movers (REM) pro-
gram. The Green Climate Fund, expected to increasingly
finance REDD+, will also follow a nonmarket-funded,
nonoffsetting model with elements of result-based pay-
ments. Tapping of global economic markets (Fletcher
et al.) may remain but a minor funding source.
Several countries’ nationally determined contributions
include REDD+, and possible policies and measures for
its implementation range from new protected areas to
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land-tenure consolidation and rural development. Sub-
national REDD+ initiatives have also diversified substan-
tially (Sills et al. 2014).More than 30 tropical federal states
and provinces affiliated with the Governors’ Climate and
Forests Task Force are developing jurisdictional REDD+
programs. Most localized REDD+ projects are essentially
integrated development and conservation projects and
sometimes include added payments for verified emission
reductions from the voluntary carbon market. This tiny
segment represents about the only genuine MBI left. In-
novative local-scale PES schemes never really took off
because of a lack of predictable funding.
Confusion often arises because REDD+ is interpreted
differently across stakeholders. The rhetoric of result-
based payments has survived, but the dominant prac-
tices in international finance, national policies, and on-
the-ground actions diverge. As practiced today, REDD+
cannot be considered a generic MBI.
Dominance of Business as Usual
The key idea of REDD+ as a global PES system was to
make forests more valuable as carbon sinks than as sup-
pliers of agricultural land and unsustainably harvested
timber. Forest conservation faces strong economic and
political opposition and this opposition has led to con-
tinued forest exploitation. To some REDD+ was and still
is a buy-out of business-as-usual interests. Yet, in the real
world REDD+ ran into the same problems as previous
conservation initiatives.
We agree with Fletcher et al. that to keep the politics
outwould be steering away from the underlying causes of
problems and would hinder implementation of solutions
that lead to transformational change. If more attention
had been given to the political economy of deforestation
and governance challenges, REDD+ might have yielded
better results by now. Yet, we also observe some evi-
dence demonstrating incipient mobilization of forces to
effectively contain business-as-usual interests, including
use of command-and-control tools rather than incentives,
to which REDD+ has certainly contributed (Brockhaus
et al. 2016).
Challenges of PES
The challenges to create a well-functioning PES system
include defining the service (i.e., emission reductions by
setting realistic reference levels to ensure additionality),
generating enough demand (market or public sources),
clarifying resource rights of service providers, establish-
ing needed institutions (rules), and avoiding perverse
incentives (Wunder 2013). The PES approach has been
less universally viable than mainstream REDD+ actors
had initially hoped.
Fletcher et al.’s critique seems based on an incom-
plete understanding of PES because they claim: “ . . . to
function as market mechanisms, payments must provide
at least as much revenue as the extractive markets they
replace, covering not only opportunity costs of extrac-
tion but also the social and environmental costs that
this extraction externalizes.” They argue that payments
must be “in excess of the revenue” and conclude that
“market-based conservation is thus a contradiction in
terms.” However, the PES logic does not suggest that
extractive companies (or local forest users) have to be
compensated for the external costs they cause. For ex-
ample, a palm-oil company may damage local watershed
protection through deforestation. This is a potentially
significant cost to local people but not a direct bene-
fit to the company. True, companies may ignore such
costs (uncompensated externalities) and thus boost their
profits. Yet, Fletcher et al. present their case as if the
company gets an additional benefit from imposing such
costs on others and therefore needs more compensation,
beyond the loss of company revenue. In fact, a company
would not need to be compensated for the loss of its
full business-as-usual profits; it would only need to be
compensated for the loss of profit related to switching to
more environmentally benign practices. This represents
the opportunity cost of forest conservation, which PES
must cover.
Fletcher et al. also argue that “[t]he problem is even
more fundamental for conservation markets like REDD+
that seek to directly offset (and are therefore funded
by) extractive activity itself . . . ” This argument suggests
REDD+ would be funded by those destroying forests
through carbon markets offsets, which would lead to
erosion of the funding base over time. First, even if the
funding base really were eroded, should one worry? If
all forest-destroying activities were capped or taxed out
of business, the need for REDD+ would vanish. Second,
a potential global carbon market would be fed by de-
mand from many capped emitters around the world, not
just forest-destroying ones. Third, revenues from these
capped companies to pay for REDD+ credits are not
generated just from ignoring environmental costs; rather,
they are generated through innovation, development of
new technologies, skilled labor, etc.
The Succession of Conservation Fads
Redford et al. (2013) consider REDD+ the latest in a long
series of conservation fads: “Recognizing fads and think-
ing of them as learning opportunities is part of accepting
that the practice of conservation has a culture, just like all
other practices.” They urge conservationists to become
“reflective practitioners who sift through multiple good
ideas, test those that are appropriate, and share . . . re-
sults.” We (and probably Fletcher et al.) agree.
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Arguably, conservation actors may have vested inter-
ests in launching fads to push for quick, often unrealistic
solutions. Donors, policy makers, and conservation and
development organizations may repeatedly create new
silver bullets to maintain optimism and justify continued
funding. Lund et al. (2017) argue that “REDD+ resembles
longstanding dynamics of the development and conser-
vation industry, where the promise of change becomes
a discursive commodity that is constantly reproduced
and used to generate value and appropriate financial re-
sources.” Likewise, researchers push and debunk fads in
successive research-grant and publication cycles.
When delivery fails, the intervention itself usually gets
the blame, as exemplified by Fletcher et al. Yet, outcomes
from conservation interventions depend not only on
generic tools in isolation but also on their design, imple-
mentation, application time, institutional environment
(e.g., transparency and rule of law), and other contextual
variables. Rather than labeling recently developed tools as
inherently good or bad, conservation professionals need
more empirical evidence to devise and sustain recom-
mendations for what works under which circumstances.
This resonates with calls for more flexible, evidence-
based policy making (Schindler & Hilborn 2015).
Are all of Redford et al.’s (2013) fads necessarily
debunked failures? All 9 fads they discuss are meant
to strengthen people-oriented conservation. Several of
them—community-based conservation, PES, and land-
scape approaches—remain firmly in the current con-
servation toolkit. One could argue that REDD+, the
most recent alleged fad, has been informed extensively
by people-oriented conservation. Discourses on REDD+
stress the need for direct payments to forest users based
on both effectiveness (creating pecuniary incentives) and
equity (compensating those who shoulder the conserva-
tion costs) (Luttrell et al. 2013).
Implementers of REDD+ clearly attempt to involve
local people in REDD+ and to promote equitable out-
comes. Such efforts range from prioritizing social safe-
guards (free, prior, and informed consent), benefit
sharing, and leveraging multistakeholder forums at sev-
eral jurisdictional levels to land tenure and governance
reforms and granting indigenous organizations control
over their own territories and REDD+ initiatives. Most
subnational REDD+ initiatives make eclectic use of mul-
tiple interventions (Sills et al. 2014), including some of
Redford et al.’s 9 fads. Hence, do real-world REDD+ prac-
titioners not already attend to Redford et al.’s (2013) call
for reflective sifting through multiple ideas?
As it has been practiced, REDD+ has already served as
a testing ground for multiple approaches—old and new.
Simply dismissing REDD+ as a debunked fad and doing so
based on flawed arguments about PES andMBI, which are
not centerpieces of REDD+ as it is currently practiced,
impedes learning. Pointing instead toward single, one-
dimensional solutions—such as the devolution of rights
to local people (Fletcher et al.)—will only prepare fertile
ground for the rise and fall of the next fad.
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